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Abstract We study frictions in trading patterns in the Euro money market. We char-
acterize the structure of lending relations during the period of recent financial turmoil.
We use a network-topology method on data from overnight transactions in the Elec-
tronic Market for Interbank Deposits (e-MID) to investigate two main issues. First, we
characterize the roles of borrowers and lenders in long-run relationships by providing
evidence on network formation at a 3-month frequency. Second, we identify the “key
players” in the marketplace and study their behavior. In our formalization, key players
are “locally-central banks” within a network that lend (or borrow) large volumes to
(from) several counterparties, while borrowing (or lending) small volumes from (to) a
small number of institutions. Our results are twofold. We show that the aggregate trad-
ing patterns in e-MID are characterized by largely asymmetric relations. This implies a
clear difference in the roles of lenders and borrowers, with market positions changing
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only gradually over time. We also find that the large net lenders exploit their positions
as network leaders by imposing aggressive pricing policies on their counterparties.
Keywords Market microstructure · Network analysis · Money markets · Money
supply
JEL Classification D85 · G01 · G10 · G21
In the no-holds barred world of trading over-the-counter derivatives in the interbank market, traders and
brokers view themselves as combatants in a professional market, where you lose one day, but can win the
next… The industry is reluctant to fully automate OTC trading because it would result in a more open and
transparent market and erode the informational advantages of the big dealers. Smaller banks have little
choice but to abide by the rules.
MacKenzie (2012)
1 Introduction
Money market transactions are one of the key funding vehicles for financial institu-
tions. The structure of the market comprises a primary provider of money, namely, the
central bank, as well as many other banks lending to each other. The centrality of the
money market was noted during the recent financial turmoil, which erupted in August
2007 in the form of a freeze on interbank lending (see Holthausen and Pill 2010).
This event demonstrated that a lockup of interbank activity has systemic implications
for all asset markets (see Holthausen and Pill 2010). Therefore, understanding trading
patterns in the interbank market is crucial for evaluating its functioning both during
normal conditions and during times of stress.
The interbank market has been characterized as a network of exchange, where
banks are nodes and cash flows denote ties (see, e.g., Iori et al. 2008). Many papers
use network-topology methods to study linkages between banks (see, e.g., Bech and
Atalay 2008; Iazzetta andManna 2009a), and the impact of these networks on demand
for and supply of cash (see, e.g., Soramaki et al. 2006).Most studies focus ondescribing
short-term bank behavior, thus studying issues of price volatility (see, e.g., Cassola
and Morana 2010) and the impact of policy measures (see, e.g., Durreé and Nardelli
2008).1
The literature shows that interbank markets are often organized as core-periphery
structures (see, e.g, Soramaki et al. 2006). This means that money markets are char-
acterized by “locally-central” banks that are closely connected, and on which all the
other banks depend for the distribution of cash. In this paper, we provide empirical
evidence on the role played by “money centers” (see Craig and von Peter 2014) in
an unsecured segment of the Euro money market, the so-called Electronic Market for
Interbank Deposits (e-MID).
1 Recent contributions focus on the systemic implications of funding risk, namely, the risk that a bank’s
shortage of cash may spill over into the entire financial system (see, e.g., Drehmann and Tarashev 2011).
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The e-MID platform provides a transparent and non-anonymous market. The way
exchanges are organized allows market participants to differentiate with regard to
counterparty characteristics, and to evaluate past trading behavior. Thus, a bank’s
reputation is a key factor in the establishment and maintenance of lending relations.2
Our dataset covers the period of the recent financial turmoil (between 2006 and 2009),
during which reputational effects were strengthened.
Our preliminary investigation of the data indicates that aggregate trading patterns
in e-MID are characterized by largely asymmetric relations in each network, implying
that there are clearly different roles played by lenders and borrowers. To put it more
clearly, there are institutions that exercise strong control on either the supply or the
demand side of the market.
We propose a methodology for identifying what we call “key players”. Key player
banks lend (borrow) large amounts of cash to many counterparties, while borrowing
(lending) small amounts from (to) a small group of banks. In short, these key players
are the driving forces behind demand and supply in the market.
Key players are especially important in networks with an asymmetric structure
because they have the power to create a bottleneck in the distribution of cash. This
may arise as the by-product of the central nodes’ “market power”.3 The question of
interest is whether this feature benefits the key players. In other words, we would like
to understand whether key players exploit their leading position by demanding higher
(lower) lending (borrowing) interest rates than the market average.
The analysis of key players reveals two main empirical facts. We show that the
composition of the group of key players—both for the supply and the demand side—
has changed every year since 2006. This indicates that e-MID is not comprised of
market playerswithmedium- or long-term trading strategies. Rather, banks’ patterns of
exchange appear contingent on short-term developments. In terms of pricing policies,
key players exploit their market position. Specifically, we find statistical evidence
suggesting that the big lenders charge interest rates above market average.
The results presented in this paper differ from those in the literature in several
respects. For example, the existent literature argues that size matters in the interbank
market. Gabrieli (2009, 2012) shows that larger European banks enjoyed a significant
reduction in overnight rates after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. This is the so-
called too-big-to-fail guarantee that larger banks have enjoyed ever since European
governments promised not to let fail any systemically important institution. Angelini
et al. (2011) study the spread between uncollateralized rates and Eurepo rates on term
contracts. Their results corroborate the findings of Gabrieli (2009, 2012).
We provide an exact identification of which banks drive the buy and sell side of the
market using the identifiers provided in our dataset. Unlike Fricke and Lux (2015),
we refrain from estimating models of network structure, which may then be used to
2 The role ofmarket reputation is also stressed by Idier andNardelli (2011) in the context of over-the-counter
segments of the Euro interbank market.
3 The issue of market power in financial networks is also investigated by Kraenzlin and von Scarpatetti
(2011), who study the price setting behavior in the Swiss Franc repo market during the turmoil period.
They find that banks use both their market power and private information to offer different lending rates
depending on the characteristics of their counterparties.
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identify the “core” banks. Rather, we build on economic intuition, and propose an
empirical strategy that is free from tight modeling assumptions. Hence, our strategy
for identifying key players takes into account—and encompasses—the core-periphery
structure documented by Fricke and Lux (2015). Our empirical strategy also allows
to evaluate the cross section of the pricing effect of key players.
Our analysis provides relevant economic insights for the ECB’s money supply
policy. The asset exchanged in the interbank market is very different in nature from
other “standard” assets. Banks need cash to carry out their daily operations. However,
due to market polarization of roles, a small group of banks controls how the cash
provided by the ECB is distributed throughout the interbankmarket. This suggests that
changes in the interbank rates alone are not an appropriate indicator of the success of
a loose money supply policy, an especially relevant issue in the context of the recent
market turmoil. In fact, during this period, the ECB implemented several extraordinary
money supply operations with the aim of easing tensions in themarket (see Lenza et al.
2010). Another relevant finding is that the market role played by large net lenders may
create conditions for “distortions” or inequality in access to cash across the demand
side, whichmay directly and negatively affect the ECB’smoney supply policy in times
of stress.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review. Section
3 describes the information available in our dataset. Section 4 provides a descriptive
analysis of the data. Section 5 describes our approach to network analysis. Section 6
presents the main patterns of the networks that provide the foundation for our study
of key players. Section 7 discusses our methodology for identifying the largest net
lenders or borrowers in each network. Section 8 discusses key player characteristics.
Section 9 concludes.
2 Literature overview
The literature on Euro area money markets suggests that the prevailing patterns of
exchange are characterized by asymmetries in the distribution of cash. It thus appears
that a small subset of banks is playing a disproportionately large role in the market,
which both justifies and makes our study relevant.
The empirical results suggest that e-MID is comprised of local structures with
hierarchical relations, core-periphery structures, and clusters. Iori et al. (2008) show
that the number of vertical links in the trading networks is heavy tailed, which suggests
that a few banks trade with many counterparties. De Masi et al. (2006) find that banks
build subgroups of trading partners to which they lend persistently. This indicates that
interbank lending has a propensity to cluster. e-MID is also characterized by a stable
core-periphery structure, whereby the “core” banks are both borrowers and lenders
(see Fricke and Lux 2015). The core-periphery is asymmetric, as the “core” borrowers
engage in more trading activity than do the “core” lenders.
Our contribution is also related to recent analyses of relationship lending in the
money market. By our definition, key players trade with many banks. In this sense,
they can be thought of as “preferential” net lenders or borrowers, as they choose their
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counterparties and are, in turn, chosen as counterparties.4 The role of preferential
relations in the money market is widely documented (see, e.g., Craig et al. 2013). The
literature, however, tends to focus on the pricing implications of these relationships.
Cocco et al. (2009) find that banks pay lower borrowing rates within their network of
relations, and trade with counterparties that face uncorrelated money-demand shocks.
Fecht et al. (2011) provide a study of the role of stable connections in the German
moneymarket. Their empirical results indicate that banks operating in formal networks
do not enjoy any preferential price treatment. Stable relations between banks do not
necessarily lead to borrowing rates that are lower than average. Rather, preferential
pricing appears correlated with the ability of an institution to avoid a net “squeeze”
vis-à-vis the aggregate money supply. Raddant (2014) identifies preferential lending
relationships in e-MID by studying the discounts offered against average lending
rates. The author shows that banks tended to borrow at a slight discount before the
Lehman bankruptcy. In the following period, borrowers with large net exposures paid
a premium on top of the average market rate.
What explains the rise and persistence of key players? The literature reveals two
important characteristics of the Euromoneymarket thatmay help answer this question.
The first involves the institutional rules governing private banks’ access to the primary
supply of cash at the ECB. The second involves asymmetric information in e-MID.
Can the institutional organization of the moneymarket lead to the emergence of key
players? Idier and Nardelli (2011) suggest that this is indeed the case. They point out
that the rules for taking part in ECB tenders have a discriminatory character. Specif-
ically, private banks can take part in liquidity operations only if they are listed as
eligible counterparties by the ECB. In addition, banks face substantial administrative
costs when taking part in ECB tenders, which can prove a disincentive, especially for
smaller banks. Idier and Nardelli (2011) provide empirical evidence suggesting that
trading in the uncollateralized segment of the overnight interbankmarket is affected by
asymmetric information among counterparties. Moreover, certain banks are not con-
strained by compulsory reserve requirements. These institutions engage in significant
trading activity. They can collect and exploit information about the aggregate liquidity
imbalance that smaller banks cannot. In other words, these studies hint at a relationship
between bank financial strength, trading propensity, and superior information about
the market.5
In this paper, we identify as key players those banks that lend/borrow large amounts
of cash from many counterparties. There are thus two main features that characterize
the key players: engagement in stable networks of market relations and quantitatively
relevant lending/borrowing activity. We design both our data handling and key-player
detection methodology based on these characteristics.
4 Iori et al. (2014) suggest that “preferential” trading is related to the “memory” of transactions. Hence,
the more often a bank has lent to a counterparty, the more likely it is that it will lend again to that borrower.
5 Babus (2006) characterizes the information leading to network formation as information about counter-
party risk, or “risk of contagion”. The author provides a theoretical model suggesting that banks minimize
the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of creating a network by choosing partners resilient to contagion
from adverse shocks. Thus, an equilibrium network has a contagion probability equal to zero. In addition,
the banks outside the network face credit rationing from part of the network components.
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Craig and von Peter (2014) provide an insightful empirical study on the role of
“centers” in the distribution of cash. They use data on German banks to show that
these institutions lend to each other through core-periphery structures. Specifically,
these institutions have a preference for supplying cash through the intermediation
of ‘locally-central’ banks, with which they already have a lending relationship. The
centrality of banks is largely correlated to their idiosyncratic characteristics. Banks
with large balance sheets tend to occupy central positions in the network. Overall,
these findings support our strategy for identifying key players.
3 The dataset
We investigate the Electronic Market for Interbank Deposits (e-MID). Transactions in
this marketplace operate through an electronic platform that is fully centralized and
operates in Milan. The market has several peculiar characteristics. The first is that it
consists of two submarkets, and, consequently, there are two types of transactions,
each of which follows different rules. In the “ask” (or buy) market, the transaction is
started by the borrower—that is, the aggressor—who borrows cash from the lender
-that is, the quoter-. In the “bid” (or sell) market, the transaction is initiated by the
lender (i.e., the aggressor) who lends to the borrower (i.e., the quoter). Transactions in
e-MID involvemoney exchange at variousmaturity structures, ranging from overnight
to 11months. However, most of the trades involve overnight maturity contracts. Banks
can choose their trading counterparty, whereas the information on rates and amounts
is made public. In addition, the minimum trade size is established a priori.
The information available distinguishes between regular size transactions, forwhich
the minimum involved is 1.5 million euros, and large transactions, for which the
minimum involved is 100 million euros. For each transaction executed through the
system, a record is produced that provides information on the identity of the aggressor
and the quoter, the amount traded, the interest rate, the date and time of delivery, and the
loan length and type. Because of privacy concerns, each e-MID member is identified
by a unique six-digit code, the first two digits signifying country of origin and the
following four a 0001 to nnnn code. This system allows determining the nationality
of a bank, but not its identity.
Table 1 reports some key statistics on the number of trading banks and trades. It
shows that our sample contains 305,489 overnight “ask” and “bid” events taking place
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2009. Since the overwhelmingmajority of
interbank market activity involves overnight transactions, we exclude longer duration
trades from the sample.
4 The organization of lending–borrowing relations: a descriptive outline
An important issue in analyzing money market transactions is defining the time unit
over which to observe market properties. Several studies document changes in the
money market at a daily frequency to discover how money exchanges occur in the
short term (see, e.g., Brunetti et al. 2011). However, this strategy does not suit the
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Table 1 Number of banks and trades
Year Quarter N banks N trades N ON trades % ON trades
2006 1 170 30,230 23,068 76.308
2 170 30,130 22,979 76.266
3 171 29,502 22,328 75.683
4 173 28,684 21,993 76.673
2007 1 171 27,747 21,083 75.983
2 171 26,622 20,047 75.302
3 172 29,332 23,738 80.928
4 171 26,889 21,579 80.252
2008 1 170 25,156 20,725 82.385
2 169 25,428 20,612 81.060
3 165 22,856 18,582 81.300
4 150 19,627 16,012 81.581
2009 1 145 16,612 14,354 86.407
2 147 16,312 14,150 86.545
3 124 13,959 12,550 89.906
4 132 16,132 14,087 87.323
purposes of our contribution.6 As stressed by Finger et al. (2013), exchange relations
in the interbankmarket cannot typically be observed at a given point in time but have to
be approximated by aggregating trades. Finger et al. (2013) also show that aggregation
over a sufficiently long time horizon might reveal a non-random structure for long-
lasting relationships. Building on their results, we aggregate our data over a quarterly
frequency. This choice also takes into account the key patterns emerging from the
data. Table 2 reports the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients computed per pairs
of quarters for the net traded volumes.7 The resulting figures confirm that using a
quarterly dataset is appropriate for our study. The values of the correlation computed
for two consecutive periods are never lower than 0.719, hinting at substantial stability
in trading behavior over a quarterly frequency.
The 2007 turmoil had several impacts on e-MID transactions. Table 1 shows the
number of market participants and the number of transactions. Both figures have
decreased over time.8 The number of banks active on at least one side of the market is
around 170 until the first quarter of 2008. The highestmarket participation occurs in the
6 Specifically, we are interested in identifying the market structure—i.e., discovering the existence of stable
relationships among pairs or subgroups of banks, detecting the persistence of roles, and interpreting our
results in light of the turmoil.
7 The net traded volume distribution is obtained as the difference between volumes lent and volumes
borrowed per bank.
8 There are banks that join or leave the system at different points in time. Across the sample period, the
total number of actors operating in e-MID is 194.
123
214 C. Liberati et al.
Table 2 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients per pair of quarters for net traded volumes
Corr I–II quarter Corr II–III quarter Corr III–IV quarter
2006 0.788 0.825 0.786
2007 0.878 0.734 0.778
2008 0.876 0.755 0.723
2009 0.874 0.749 0.719
The correlation coefficients are all significant at the 0.05 level
fourth quarter of 2006, after which the number of participating institutions drops. The
lowest number of banks (124) is observed in the third quarter of 2009. Similar patterns
can be seen in the number of trades. Interestingly enough, the percentage of overnight
trades has become a progressivelymore significant part of overall trades since the third
trimester of 2007, revealing a higher propensity of banks toward short-term loans.
Finally, the size of trades also changed noticeably after the turmoil began. In the
first panel of Table 3, we report some selected statistics on traded volumes. The freeze
in market activity that characterizes the turmoil period is reflected by the decrease in
total volume traded, which drops by 14% from 2006 to 2007, by 20% from 2007 to
2008, and by about 40% from 2008 to 2009. The decrease in average volumes from
25,866 in the second trimester of 2006 to 15,450 in the third trimester of 2009 paints a
similar picture. The decreasing trend becomes sharper after the third quarter of 2008.
The patterns in volumes traded affect the evolution of lending rates over the sample
period. The second panel of Table 3 reports some statistics on the interbank interest
rates. Both the mean and the median rates rose steadily from the beginning of the
observation period (i.e., the average interest rate was 2.398 in the first quarter of 2006)
to the beginning of the financial crisis (i.e., the average interest rate was 4.218—the
highest value observed—in the third quarter of 2008). In contrast to the findings on
traded volumes, this evidence signals that the market had started raising interest rates
long before the turmoil period begun. From the third quarter of 2008, then, the market
freeze led to a consistent drop in interest rates, hitting a low of 0.299 in the third
trimester of 2009.
Changes in the behavior of e-MID participants deserve attention. Table 4 reports
some descriptive statistics on volumes lent and borrowed per bank. In each period,
only a fraction (though high) of the banks active in e-MID operate on both sides of the
market. The share of lenders is high (with a maximum of 93.7% of the total number
of banks) and almost constant in the first 3 years of the observation period. Then, this
number drops during 2009, reaching its lowest point (83.3%) in the fourth trimester
of that year. The share of borrowers reaches a peak of 86.3% in the third quarter of
2006; a low of 73% is observed in the second quarter of 2009.
These statistics indicate that e-MID is comprised of financial institutions that focus
on lending activities, banks devoted mostly to borrowing, and banks operating on
both sides of the market. In short, e-MID appears to be a market in which banks with
diverse dominant roles co-exist. Additional evidence for this is obtained by observing
standard deviations of the distributions of deposits (both lent and borrowed) per bank.
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Table 3 Selected average statistics on traded volumes and interest rates
Year Quarter 1 2 3 4
Volumes
2006 Mean 25.125 25.867 24.965 22.582
Median 15 15 15 12
Min 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.050
Max 500.000 500.000 500.000 500.000
Sum 579586.340 594392.460 557422.510 496636.840
Std dev 29.619 33.389 32.344 28.619
2007 Mean 23.223 22.944 21.968 20.284
Median 12.500 13.000 11.000 10.000
Min 0.100 0.100 0.050 0.060
Max 600.000 980.000 600.000 850.000
Sum 489614.460 459956.790 521465.090 437707.900
Std dev 32.249 31.230 31.873 34.398
2008 Mean 19.547 20.888 20.091 18.847
Median 10 10 10 10
Min 0.100 0.050 0.050 0.300
Max 1000.000 1050.000 700.000 1000.000
Sum 405109.340 430543.410 373334.620 301774.060
Std dev 33.335 29.096 26.512 30.943
2009 Mean 16.444 18.602 15.450 19.267
Median 10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000
Min 0.300 0.450 0.050 0.250
Max 200.000 600.000 450.000 1000.000
Sum 236035.410 263223.960 193894.120 271419.960
Std dev 18.876 22.596 17.755 26.308
Interest rates
2006 Mean 2.398 2.628 2.928 3.363
Median 2.345 2.605 3.000 3.325
Min 1.100 1.450 1.720 2.200
Max 2.680 2.970 3.160 3.820
Std dev 0.129 0.127 0.137 0.150
2007 Mean 3.601 3.850 4.077 3.943
Median 3.570 3.830 4.070 4.005
Min 2.450 2.700 2.000 1.500
Max 4.300 4.310 5.000 4.700
Std dev 0.152 0.172 0.216 0.173
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Table 3 continued
Year Quarter 1 2 3 4
2008 Mean 4.040 3.971 4.218 3.061
Median 4.030 3.990 4.280 3.120
Min 2.600 2.700 2.800 1.870
Max 4.500 4.500 4.800 5.100
Std dev 0.095 0.126 0.207 0.587
2009 Mean 1.234 0.668 0.329 0.299
Median 1.150 0.700 0.300 0.290
Min 0.470 0.180 0.180 0.180
Max 2.600 1.700 0.850 0.750
Std dev 0.394 0.237 0.077 0.057
Traded volumes are expressed in million Euros
The high dispersion of the data with respect to the average indicates rather different
approaches to trading.
The volume traded distributions reveal an important fact, and one that is the starting
point for further analysis in this paper: there is a high concentration of banks on both
the lending and the borrowing side. At the beginning of the observation period, 10
banks, most of which are Italian, are responsible for 39.71% of the total volume lent.
This percentage remains almost constant over time: it drops to 37.51% in the third
trimester of 2007, rises again to a maximum of 43.37% in the second quarter of 2008,
and finally decreases to 40.86% at the end of the observation period. A similar picture
emerges for the demand for deposits. On this side of the market, however, the level
of resource concentration is stronger and the trend slightly more unstable. The first
10 banks—again, all of Italian—account for 61.08% of the market at the beginning
of 2006 and for 73%—the highest value—at the end of 2009, with a minimum of
51.84% in the first quarter of 2007. As discussed thoroughly by the ECB (2010),
the nationality of market participants plays a key role in e-MID. The counterparties
belong to 16 different countries, with Italian banks the largest group of institutions.
The weight of Italian banks in e-MID increases over time, as an increasing number of
foreign banks leaves the market. Statistics not reported in the interest of brevity point
to a division of roles across nationalities, with French, Greek, and Dutch banks mostly
lending, and British banks mostly borrowing.
5 Aspects of data handling and methods for network analysis
To analyze the structure of the money market and detect individual behavior, we use
methods from social network analysis (SNA) (see, e.g., Wasserman and Faust 1994;
Carrington et al. 2005; Borgatti et al. 2009). This framework has been applied in
many contexts, ranging from the study of interpersonal relations to inter-organizational
dynamics. With regard to relationships among banks, SNA has proven effective in
examining the topological properties of the money market (see De Masi et al. 2006;
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Table 4 Selected average
statistics on cash volumes lent
and borrowed
The figures reported here are
expressed in million Euros
Year Quarter % Banks Mean Std dev
Amount lent
2006 1 0.913 3969.769 6532.446
2 0.890 4099.258 7623.740
3 0.925 3741.091 7278.590
4 0.896 3378.482 5462.841
2007 1 0.929 3376.651 5568.977
2 0.880 3309.042 5465.255
3 0.937 3499.766 5718.777
4 0.919 3194.948 5133.523
2008 1 0.917 3045.935 4775.071
2 0.897 3311.872 5264.287
3 0.921 2894.067 4442.886
4 0.882 2694.411 4808.469
2009 1 0.867 2126.445 3000.817
2 0.881 2371.387 3354.567
3 0.917 1958.526 2480.658
4 0.833 2,467,454 3,048,374
Amount borrowed
2006 1 0.794 4563.672 10229.864
2 0.804 4537.347 9652.734
3 0.863 4010.234 10273.038
4 0.799 3791.121 7971.481
2007 1 0.808 3885.829 8146.682
2 0.804 3621.707 7191.813
3 0.742 4419.196 8316.538
4 0.832 3529.902 6610.083
2008 1 0.752 3716.599 7003.744
2 0.779 3810.119 7496.590
3 0.771 3456.802 7232.545
4 0.748 3176.569 6178.868
2009 1 0.758 2433.355 5138.561
2 0.730 2861.130 6064.351
3 0.750 2393.755 4642.110
4 0.750 2,741,616 3,048,374
Iori et al. 2008; Hatzopoulos et al. 2013) and in assessing the resilience of the banking
system to financial crises and risks of contagion (Markose et al. 2009).
In this paper, we use SNA to assess the stability of network relations and to iden-
tify the most important actors in such networks. Building on previous studies (see,
e.g., Iori et al. 2008), the transactions are represented as a network N (V, E). The
network nodes V are the banks, and ties E are identified as the money lent from one
institution to another. Aggressors and quoters are reclassified as lenders and receivers
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(or the opposite, depending on the submarket explored) based on cash flow direction.
Therefore, we assume that a tie exists from bank i to bank j when i lends money to j ,
independent of the origin of the transaction (i.e., whether the transaction is an “ask”
or a “bid”). We have the following two cases:
1. For bid transactions, the tie goes from the aggressor (lender) to the quoter
(receiver).
2. For ask transactions, the tie goes from the quoter (lender) to the aggressor
(receiver).
Since the tie from i to j (ei j ) is different from the tie from j to i(e ji ), the network is
defined as “directed”. To each tie, we attach a weight wi j that represents the amount
of money that i lends to j over a given time span.
We computed the weight wi j as the 3-month amount lent from i to j . Formally:
wi j =
H∑
z=1
ti j z (1)
where ti j z is the amount of the transaction z from i to j per 3-month time window, and
H denotes the number of transactions from i to j per 3-month time window. Then, we
build 16 networks, one for each period. Each network corresponds to an asymmetric
adjacency matrix W of size n × n whose generic element is wi j (i = 1, . . . , n; j =
1, . . . , n; i = j).
The analysis is performed on two levels. First, we consider the full structure of
transactions at the network level for each period. This analysis is intended to provide
some general insight into the interaction among banks and verify the existing of a
network structure, thus justifying further investigation. We then shift our focus to the
role played by banks in the network. This second level of analysis leads to the identi-
fication of market inefficiencies or bottlenecks, that is, the existence and persistence
over time of banks that control the supply or demand of deposits in the market. Their
behavior and pricing policies are then studied in detail. We repeat this process for
each of the 16 quarterly networks to have some insight into the stability of long-term
network relations over time.9 Also, this analytic framework allows us to shed light on
how various phases of the turmoil affected the market behavior of e-MID participants.
6 Measures of network activity
6.1 Results from network-level analysis
In this section, we study the entire network structure with the purpose of detecting
preferential trading patters. We also investigate how these patterns changed during the
turmoil period.
9 To run the analysis, we use the software packages sna (see Butts 2008, 2010), igraph (see Csardi and
Nepusz 2006), and tnet (see Opsahl 2011), developed within the R statistical computing environment and
specifically designed for network studies.
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Fig. 1 Descriptive network measures
We compute relevant measures of network activity. Network density is the most
basic descriptive index. Density is the proportion of possible ties that are actually
present in the network to the maximum possible; that is, a measure of completeness.
Formally, in the case of a directed network, the density  is computed as follows (see
Wasserman and Faust 1994):
 = L
n (n − 1) (2)
The term L denotes the number of ties in the empirical network. Since a directed tie
can be seen as an ordered pair of nodes, there are n(n − 1) possible ties. The density
coefficient ranges between 0 (no ties are present) and 1 (all ties are present).
The results are reported in Fig. 1. In our network, density is moderate (it ranges
from 0.10 to 0.14) and almost constant over time. A slight decrease is observed in
the third quarter of 2007 and again in the third quarter of 2008. Overall, the density
values indicate that the network is sparse; less than 15% of the possible ties among
the banks actually exist. Although all the banks can participate in trading, this value
signals that only a fraction of them are actually active and/or selected as counterparties
(see Fig. 2).
Reciprocity focuses on the relationship between pairs of nodes. It identifies amutual
exchange of money between pairs of banks. Therefore, it implies the existence of a
non-hierarchical relationship among actors. A node pair (i, j) is called “reciprocal”
if there are ties between both parties in both directions. Hence, the reciprocity of
a directed network is the proportion of all possible (i, j) pairs that are reciprocal,
provided there is at least one tie between i and j . Like density, the reciprocity index
varies between 0 and 1:
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Fig. 2 Networks of lending-borrowing relations. Legend: the white circles denote banks and the gray lines
denote directed ties between pairs of them
r =
∑
i j ei j e ji
L
(3)
The values of the reciprocity index for e-MID are very low and point to a lack of
bidirectional exchange between banks. The percentage of reciprocal dyads is always
lower than 15% and declines significantly over time. It is equal to 10.80% in the first
period of 2006, increases to 15.10% inmid 2007, and then decreases almost steadily to
5.80% by the end of 2009. This indicates a tendency toward asymmetric relations that
becomes stronger over time. In other words, there seems to be a strong and increasing
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distinction of roles in e-MID when shifting from stability to financial crisis. Indeed,
this tendency emerges as soon as the turmoil starts.
Finally, the clustering effect studies the network’s degree of interconnectedness and
the structural embeddedness of its nodes. In organizational studies, embeddedness is
interpreted as the overwhelming presence of links, which fosters both trust and coop-
erative behavior. Also, embeddedness and closure reduce uncertainty and information
asymmetry between two actors. The clustering coefficient examines relations involv-
ing three nodes and measures the tendency of nodes to cluster into tightly knit groups.
A positive clustering coefficient, therefore, implies an increase in the likelihood that
two nodes will be connected if they share a common acquaintance. We apply the
specification of clustering coefficient proposed by Opsahl and Panzarasa (2009), that
is, the generalized global clustering coefficient. It is defined as the number of closed
triplets (i.e., three nodes connected by three ties) over the total number of triplets.
Also, it explicitly takes weights of ties into account. In formula:
Cw =
∑
τ
w
∑
τw
(4)
with τ the number of closed triplets, τ the number of triplets, and w the weights of
ties. Cw ranges between 0 and 1.
The interconnectedness of the interbank market is fairly moderate and seems to
follow a slightly increasing trend. The coefficient reaches its maximum in 2008, when
the turmoil turns into the financial crisis and remains high during the crisis. The low
is 0.51, which occurs at the beginning of the observation period, before the turmoil
starts. The highest peak (0.62) is in the third period of 2008, exactly when the most
severe phase of the crisis began. The increase inmarket uncertainty, therefore, seems to
slightly increase market complexity as well as banks’ propensity to trade money with
closed cohesive groups of partners. The increase in the tendency toward clustering
emerges later than the tendency toward reciprocity.
6.2 Perspectives from actor-level analysis
The second level of our analysis examines the position of each bank within the
interbank network. We also study the relation between network position and pricing
policies. This is a relevant investigation in light of empirical findings in the literature
on relationship lending. For instance, Hatzopoulos et al. (2013) show that information
on volumes lent does not suffice to explain the average interest rates that classes of
borrowers pay in e-MID.
The identification of an actor’s involvement in network activity is a crucial topic
in the literature on social networks. For instance, the detection of actors important
for the network is a long-standing issue. These actors are generally defined as “key
players” (see Borgatti 2006), and are usually identified via several indices. Centrality
measures focus on the structural importance of nodes (see Freeman 1979). Social cap-
ital measures assess which actors benefit most from a specific network structure (see
Burt 1992; Borgatti et al. 1998). Key-player detection algorithms identify actors that
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contribute to cohesion and resource diffusion or to network disruption and fragmen-
tation (see Borgatti 2006) and are employed when investigating systemic risks and
related issues.
The literature on financial markets focuses mainly on centrality measures by com-
puting their distributions (Iori et al. 2008; Iazzetta and Manna 2009b), or by studying
the correlation between actor centrality values and actor behaviors (Ozsoylev et al.
2011). Various centralitymeasures have been adopted for these purposes. For instance,
Ozsoylev et al. (2011) use eigenvector centrality, which links actor centrality to the
centrality of others to which the actor is connected.10 Walden (2013) underlines that
other frequently used centrality measures—for example, betweenness and closeness
centrality—do not capture the information advantage of the key players. Adamic et al.
(2010) use a linear combination of in- and out-degree centrality to identify dominant
buyers and sellers.
Our goal is to detect the key players so that we can study the relation between
their market activity and their pricing strategies. Hence, we extend the approach of
Adamic et al. (2010) in several directions. We detect key players using a complex
index that combines different aspects of trading behavior. Intuitively, we would like
to measure the importance of a node by looking at its direct ties, which indicate the
lending (outgoing) or receiving (incoming) position of a node. In line with Adamic
et al. (2010), we assume that both lending and pricing patterns are mostly based on
a bank’s local position within its neighborhood, that is, mainly on direct interactions
rather than on position within the entire network structure.
We identify prominent banks through a measure that weights the amount traded by
each bank by the centrality of the bank within the network of transactions. This is a
linear transformation of the generalized degree centrality proposed by Opsahl et al.
(2010), defined as the product between the number of nodes actor i is connected to
(i.e., degree centrality) and the average weight of these nodes (i.e., degree strength).
Degree centrality takes into consideration the network activity of each bank. Degree
strength accounts for the values of ties, namely, the amount traded by each bank. In
doing so, generalized degree centrality summarizes pieces of information that previous
papers only interpret separately (see, e.g., Bech and Atalay 2008). Generalized degree
centrality has been applied in various settings. It has proven capable of capturing the
existence of network hierarchies (Wycislik and Warchal 2012; Kinne 2012). We write
our centrality index as:
CwαO (i) = ki ×
(
si
ki
)α
= k(1−α)i × sαi (5)
The constant α is a positive tuning parameter that determines the relative importance
of the number of ties compared to tie weights (the amount). For α = 0, the value of
the measure equals the degree centrality. So, the measure identifies prominent actors
by looking only at their network activity. For α = 1, the measure equals the node
strength. Hence, it accounts for only the amount traded.
10 This choice is based on the assumptions that actors earn high profits by trading on the information they
obtain through the network and that eigenvector centrality effectively captures access to information.
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To investigate the information content of both degree centrality and degree strength,
we start by studying the distributions of these indices separately. Then, we provide a
synthesis in a key-player measure. Degree centrality counts the number of ties that are
incident to a node or, equivalently, the number of nodes adjacent to it (see Freeman
1979). In directed networks, this can be specified as either “in-degree” or “out-degree”
centrality, depending on whether incoming or outgoing ties are considered.
In-degree centrality looks at the number of actors that choose i as a counterparty
and lend money to it. This is an indicator of a bank’s prestige or popularity because
it evaluates the i’s market reputation as a trading partner. This is extremely important
in the context of our analysis. Since our study focuses on a non-collateralized market,
a measure of a bank’s reputation in the marketplace conveys relevant information.
In-degree centrality is computed as:
k+i =
∑
j
e ji (6)
where k + i ranges between 0, if i has no incoming ties, and (n − 1).
Out-degree centrality counts the number of nodes to which actor i sends ties, and
measures i’s trading activity. This statistic sheds light on a bank’s capability to lend
cash and to maintain relationships. It takes the form
ki+ =
∑
j
ei j (7)
Examining the shape of the in-degree and out-degree centrality distributions can reveal
important patterns. In the literature on social networks, this analysis is usually per-
formed by plotting the empirical distributions against the corresponding power law
ones (seeBarabasi andReka1999). The power lawdistribution postulates that the prob-
ability P(k) that a node interacts with k other nodes decays following P(k) ∝ k−γ
with an exponent γ between 2.1 and 4. The distribution shape introduces the hypoth-
esis that the networks are built through a preferential mechanism, where new actors
have a higher probability of connecting to more popular actors than to other agents.
This feature leads to ”the richer-get-richer” phenomenon, where highly connected
nodes (large k) have a large chance of occurring.11
Figures 3 and 4 plot the distributions for in-degree and out-degree centrality, respec-
tively. Consistent with studies based on higher frequency data (e.g., see Iori et al.
2008), our findings show that both the in- and out-degree distributions are heavy
tailed, although they do not follow a proper power law. This shape suggests the pres-
ence of a high degree of heterogeneity across banks in their trading behavior. It also
justifies the choice of accounting for the network activity of each bank when studying
its behavior. Figures 3 and 4 also indicate that there are several banks that exchange
cash with just a few counterparties, whereas other banks tend to deal with a wider
pool of institutions. The in-degree distribution is especially right tailed, suggesting
that some banks borrowed from a range of 103–107 banks at most until 2007, 89–99
11 Ozsoylev and Walden (2009) suggest that this topological property holds for complex networks.
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Fig. 3 In-degree probability distribution with power law fitting. Legend: on the horizontal axis there are
the in-degree (panels a–d) values and on the vertical axis the complement of the cumulative distribution
function P(X) = P(X ≥ x). The points represent the observed values of the cumulative density functions
and the dashed line the corresponding power law. The goodness of fit between the data and the power law
is calculated using the method described in Clauset et al. (2009) and based on a Kolmogorov–Smirnov
statistic. Since the resulting p value is smaller than 0.1 the power law is not a plausible hypothesis for the
data
banks in 2008, and 66–73 in 2009. While the shapes of the in- and out-degree distri-
butions remain almost the same over time, a deeper investigation of the descriptive
statistics indicates that the absolute values have decreased fairly constantly, in line
with the reduction in market size. The average number of counterparties is 19 in all
quarters of 2006 and 18 in 2007, then falls to 14 at the end of 2008 and to 14 in 2009.
Building on Bech and Atalay (2008), we explore the amount traded by each bank,
that is, its financial strength. The key question in this context is whether the traded
volumes are controlled by a small number of banks.12 Hence,wemeasure node strength
(see Barrat et al. 2004) as the sum of i’s incoming or outgoing tie weights wi j :
s+i =
∑
j
w j i (8)
12 Note that the high values of market concentration support this proposition.
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Fig. 4 Out-degree probability distribution with power law fitting. Legend: on the horizontal axis there are
the out-degree (panels a–d) values and on the vertical axis the complement of the cumulative distribution
function P(X) = P(X ≥ x). The points represent the observed values of the cumulative density functions
and the dashed line the corresponding power law. The goodness of fit between the data and the power law
is calculated using the method described in Clauset et al. (2009) and based on a Kolmogorov–Smirnov
statistic. Since the resulting p value is smaller than 0.1 the power law is not a plausible hypothesis for the
data
for incoming ties and
si+ =
∑
i
wi j (9)
for outgoing ties. For reasons of parsimony, the in- and out-strength distributions are
not displayed here. However, we note that they resemble the related dichotomous
degree version. They are both skewed and heavy tailed, suggesting that few banks
borrow—or lend, on the other side of the market—large amounts of cash.
In Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8, we report Pearson’s correlation coefficients between node
degree and strength for each quarter.13 These measures are only partially proportional
to one another. Specifically, the values vary between 0.39 (in the fourth quarter of
13 The correlations are computed for five values of α, within a range of α = 0 and α = 1.
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Table 5 Pearson’s correlation coefficients between pairs of generalized degree centrality indices for year
2006 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
Outgoing ties Incoming ties
α 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Quarter I Quarter I
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.951 1.000 0.973 1.000
0.50 0.859 0.974 1.000 0.920 0.985 1.000
0.75 0.765 0.920 0.984 1.000 0.861 0.952 0.990 1.000
1.00 0.675 0.853 0.945 0.988 1.000 0.800 0.909 0.965 0.992 1.000
Quarter II Quarter II
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.952 1.000 0.974 1.000
0.50 0.853 0.970 1.000 0.922 0.985 1.000
0.75 0.746 0.906 0.981 1.000 0.864 0.953 0.990 1.000
1.00 0.648 0.833 0.938 0.987 1.000 0.806 0.912 0.967 0.993 1.000
Quarter III Quarter III
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.950 1.000 0.964 1.000
0.50 0.844 0.967 1.000 0.888 0.977 1.000
0.75 0.720 0.890 0.976 1.000 0.804 0.929 0.986 1.000
1.00 0.600 0.794 0.917 0.981 1.000 0.727 0.874 0.955 0.991 1.000
Quarter IV Quarter IV
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.950 1.000 0.964 1.000
0.50 0.844 0.967 1.000 0.888 0.977 1.000
0.75 0.721 0.890 0.976 1.000 0.804 0.929 0.986 1.000
1.00 0.600 0.794 0.917 0.981 1.000 0.727 0.874 0.955 0.991 1.000
The correlation coefficients are all significant at 0.05 level
2008) and 0.69 (in the second quarter of 2007) for outgoing ties, and between 0.70 (in
the third quarter of 2009) and 0.97 (in the second quarter of 2007) for incoming ties.
Hence, a separate analysis of the two measures—especially for outgoing ties—may
provide incomplete information on node prominence. Using a composite indicator
such as the generalized degree centrality index appears to be a reasonable empirical
strategy for detecting key players.
7 Our approach for detecting key players
We define key players with a linear transformation of the generalized degree centrality
index. This approach accounts for node degree and node strength and for outgoing and
incoming ties. This definition allows testing the proposition that actors in the interbank
market play different roles, that is, some banks are net lenders while others are net
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Table 6 Pearson’s correlation coefficients between pairs of generalized degree centrality indices for year
2007 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
Outgoing ties Incoming ties
α 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Quarter I Quarter I
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.946 1.000 0.975 1.000
0.50 0.840 0.969 1.000 0.919 0.983 1.000
0.75 0.732 0.906 0.982 1.000 0.848 0.941 0.987 1.000
1.00 0.638 0.836 0.943 0.988 1.000 0.773 0.885 0.953 0.989 1.000
Quarter II Quarter II
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.955 1.000 0.975 1.000
0.50 0.865 0.974 1.000 0.920 0.984 1.000
0.75 0.771 0.919 0.984 1.000 0.856 0.947 0.989 1.000
1.00 0.689 0.860 0.951 0.990 1.000 0.971 0.901 0.963 0.992 1.000
Quarter III Quarter III
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.946 1.000 0.979 1.000
0.50 0.837 0.968 1.000 0.928 0.984 1.000
0.75 0.724 0.900 0.980 1.000 0.862 0.945 0.988 1.000
1.00 0.622 0.824 0.936 0.987 1.000 0.788 0.891 0.955 0.990 1.000
Quarter IV Quarter IV
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.953 1.000 0.975 1.000
0.50 0.861 0.973 1.000 0.923 0.985 1.000
0.75 0.754 0.909 0.979 1.000 0.862 0.950 0.990 1.000
1.00 0.604 0.778 0.882 0.955 1.000 0.800 0.906 0.964 0.992 1.000
The correlation coefficients are all significant at 0.05 level
borrowers. In particular, we consider the idea that some of the institutions control the
cash flow exchanged in the market by lending (or borrowing) large amounts of money
to (from) many counterparties. They represent large net lenders (borrowers) to (from)
the market. In other words, the role of a big lender involves a combination of lending
large volumes to many banks, and borrowing small volumes from just a few others.
A big borrower is one that receives cash from many counterparties, while lending to
a few.
In statistical terms, the key players are identified by a high absolute value of the
difference between the generalized out- and in-degree centrality, denoted byCwαO−I (i).
If this difference is positive, the key player is a net lender; otherwise, it is a net
borrower. From an economic point of view, understanding the role of key players
requires introducing hypotheses not yet considered in the literature. A large share
of market volume controlled by key players suggests that available funds are not
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Table 7 Pearson’s correlation coefficients between pairs of generalized degree centrality indices for year
2008 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
Outgoing ties Incoming ties
α 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Quarter I Quarter I
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.953 1.000 0.975 1.000
0.50 0.861 0.973 1.000 0.923 0.985 1.000
0.75 0.754 0.909 0.979 1.000 0.863 0.950 0.990 1.000
1.00 0.604 0.778 0.882 0.955 1.000 0.800 0.906 0.964 0.992 1.000
Quarter II Quarter II
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.953 1.000 0.974 1.000
0.50 0.856 0.971 1.000 0.924 0.986 1.000
0.75 0.749 0.908 0.981 1.000 0.868 0.954 0.991 1.000
1.00 0.649 0.835 0.938 0.987 1.000 0.809 0.912 0.966 0.992 1.000
Quarter III Quarter III
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.951 1.000 0.975 1.000
0.50 0.849 0.970 1.000 0.922 0.984 1.000
0.75 0.740 0.906 0.981 1.000 0.861 0.949 0.989 1.000
1.00 0.643 0.834 0.940 0.988 1.000 0.799 0.905 0.964 0.992 1.000
Quarter IV Quarter IV
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.954 1.000 0.975 1.000
0.50 0.819 0.950 1.000 0.910 0.979 1.000
0.75 0.611 0.798 0.943 1.000 0.821 0.922 0.981 1.000
1.00 0.389 0.591 0.795 0.949 1.000 0.718 0.843 0.932 0.984 1.000
The correlation coefficients are all significant at 0.05 level
distributed evenly across market participants. The presence of non-atomistic actors
raises the question of whether e-MID is characterized by perfect competition.
Since there is no information as to the weight to be assigned to node degree and
strength, a meaningful value for the parameter α cannot be set a priori. Following
Opsahl et al. (2010), we experiment with five different values, namely, 0, 0.25, 0.50,
0.75, and 1. Using only the volumes traded would completely ignore the network
structure and imply α = 1. By contrast, considering only the network position would
require setting α = 0. Hence, we use these two extreme values as a benchmark. Using
the three central values of α—0.25, 0.50, and 0.75—assigns an increasing role to
information in traded volumes, while providing understanding of how network degree
centrality influences banks’ pricing strategies.
The Pearson’s correlation coefficients computed between pairs of generalized
degree centrality distributions suggest that the value α = 0.5 is the most suitable
for our exploratory investigation. For both outgoing and incoming ties, this value gen-
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Table 8 Pearson’s correlation coefficients between pairs of generalized degree centrality indices for year
2009 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
Outgoing ties Incoming ties
α 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Quarter I Quarter I
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.963 1.000 0.970 1.000
0.50 0.876 0.972 1.000 0.904 0.980 1.000
0.75 0.769 0.907 0.980 1.000 0.826 0.935 0.986 1.000
1.00 0.663 0.828 0.934 0.986 1.000 0.749 0.878 0.953 0.990 1.000
Quarter II Quarter II
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.963 1.000 0.970 1.000
0.50 0.876 0.972 1.000 0.904 0.980 1.000
0.75 0.769 0.907 0.980 1.000 0.826 0.935 0.986 1.000
1.00 0.663 0.828 0.934 0.986 1.000 0.749 0.878 0.953 0.990 1.000
Quarter III Quarter III
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.949 1.000 0.971 1.000
0.50 0.841 0.967 1.000 0.899 0.976 1.000
0.75 0.724 0.899 0.980 1.000 0.803 0.917 0.981 1.000
1.00 0.617 0.822 0.936 0.987 1.000 0.702 0.840 0.935 0.986 1.000
Quarter IV Quarter IV
0 1.000 1.000
0.25 0.962 1.000 0.969 1.000
0.50 0.870 0.971 1.000 0.900 0.979 1.000
0.75 0.756 0.902 0.978 1.000 0.822 0.934 0.987 1.000
1.00 0.639 0.813 0.925 0.983 1.000 0.749 0.882 0.957 0.991 1.000
The correlation coefficients are all significant at 0.05 level
erates correlation coefficients that are higher than those of alternative α. It summarizes
adequately both the information on volumes traded and the number of counterparties.
Also, it assigns equal importance to them, thus providing the most conservative list of
“key players”.
Figure 5 plots the CwαO−I (i) distributions, α = 0.5. For all the sample period, the
distribution exhibits a similar shape,which is fairly symmetric around0, i.e., the neutral
position. The first part of the distribution is flat, then increases steadily, following a
linear function, and finally very sharply in the tails. About 35–40% of the actors fall
within a very small interval around 0. Therefore, they do not have a definite role nor
market power, but lend/borrow around the same amount of money to/from a similar
number of counterparties. Each of these banks has a market share smaller than 0.2%.
The left and right tails of the distributions depicted in Fig. 5 identify banks that
act mainly as either only lenders, or only borrower. Depending on which value of
CwαO−I (i)we use to identify the tails, we observe that institutions located in this part of
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Fig. 5 Distributions of net cash providers. Legend: the graphs report the actors on the horizontal axis, and
CwαO−I (i) on the vertical axis
the distribution account for around 35–40% of volumes traded in the market. In other
words, the largest share of cash in e-MID is traded by a small number of banks. Both
the demand and the supply side of the market are characterized by banks that play a
clear role either as lenders, or as borrowers.
The increase in the values of CwαO−I (i) and also in the market shares is particularly
sharp after the 95th percentile, and before the 5th percentile. To investigate the link
between being a key player and enjoying market power, we focus our attention on the
tails of theCwαO−I (i) distribution. Hence, we set the threshold t1 = 95th percentile and
define as large cash providers the banks withCwαO−I (i) ≥ t1. Then, we set t2 = 5th per-
centile and consider as large cash borrowers the institutionswith a value ofCwαO−I (i) ≤
t2. According to our definition, we consider both types of banks as key players.
8 What role for big lenders and big borrowers?
Identifyingwhich nodes play a key role in a network is a difficult task. This is especially
the case in financial markets where the opportunistic behavior of market players is
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Table 9 Descriptive statistics for the big lenders for 2006–2007
2006 I Market GR0006 IT0185 IT0187 IT0257 IT0258 IT0259 IT0269 IT0278
Rate 2.398 2.420 2.433 2.408 2.360 2.406 2.418 2.418 2.396
Std dev 0.119 0.111 0.116 0.130 0.123 0.129 0.124 0.111
Amount 579586.34 19193.9 17840.05 18110.13 31921.32 28070.16 16401.54 47313.8 18082.8
Trades 378 428 1169 859 1008 837 1375 870
Perc 3.312 3.078 3.125 5.508 4.843 2.830 8.163 3.120
2006 II Market IT0185 IT0187 IT0258 IT0259 IT0261 IT0265 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 2.628 2.670 2.627 2.619 2.653 2.621 2.633 2.617 2.668
Std dev 0.111 0.108 0.117 0.138 0.109 0.092 0.121 0.153
Amount 594392.460 18831.7 12824.1 22543.85 16685.08 26772.28 31562.68 67186.09 26383.6
Trades 365 828 822 658 575 334 1657 989
Perc 3.168 2.158 3.793 2.807 4.504 5.310 11.303 4.439
2006 III Market IT0193 IT0258 IT0259 IT0261 IT0263 IT0265 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 2.927 2.941 2.887 2.928 2.919 2.923 2.916 2.924 2.916
Std dev 0.135 0.118 0.134 0.129 0.141 0.140 0.132 0.137
Amount 557422.51 10430.79 20232.34 26046.97 18495.55 14135 21187.62 43444.93 55409.01
Trades 789 790 839 415 348 255 1280 1533
Perc 1.871 3.630 4.673 3.318 2.536 3.801 7.794 9.940
2006 IV Market GR0006 IT0173 IT0187 IT0193 IT0242 IT0265 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 3.363 3.352 3.359 3.382 3.359 3.403 3.431 3.355 3.354
Std dev 0.151 0.148 0.144 0.140 0.164 0.181 0.151 0.146
Amount 496636.84 14159.7 11520 12451.2 9023.71 7264.4 14336 40279.56 36338.89
Trades 266 522 810 812 494 240 1085 1311
Perc 2.851 2.320 2.507 1.817 1.463 2.887 8.110 7.317
2007 I Market IT0187 IT0193 IT0198 IT0257 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 3.601 3.614 3.604 3.605 3.619 3.642 3.602 3.583
Std dev 0.129 0.182 0.156 0.132 0.128 0.156 0.137
Amount 489614.46 15263.6 8510.07 10197.8 43397.45 22892.45 27298.62 23717.37
Trades 21083 1073 830 559 1267 407 928 1083
Perc 3.117 1.738 2.083 8.864 4.676 5.576 4.844
2007 II Market IT0185 IT0187 IT0208 IT0257 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 3.849 3.876 3.858 3.853 3.858 3.877 3.824 3.807
Std dev 0.099 0.149 0.161 0.155 0.165 0.176 0.171
Amount 459956.79 18727.5 16853.26 10922.8 43270.31 23833.94 23080 13118.2
Trades 20047 428 1091 646 1221 538 807 612
Perc 4.072 3.664 2.375 9.407 5.182 5.018 2.852
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Table 9 continued
2007 III Market IT0187 IT0193 IT0208 IT0224 IT0255 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 4.077 4.107 4.107 4.087 4.087 4.049 4.073 4.060 4.014
Std dev 0.190 0.226 0.264 0.212 0.161 0.160 0.223 0.243
Amount 521465.09 16585.8 11237.1 10619.8 14523.97 13577.26 41724.16 29354 15553.4
Trades 23,738 1135 971 810 544 399 1114 1223 763
Perc 3.181 2.155 2.037 2.785 2.604 8.001 5.629 2.983
2007 IV Market IT0187 IT0193 IT0224 IT0255 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 3.943 3.970 3.963 3.938 3.950 3.982 3.923 3.898
Std dev 0.139 0.154 0.198 0.166 0.151 0.183 0.165
Amount 437707.9 12469.1 11737.64 14362.63 15140.6 25628.34 26735.6 25187.11
Trades 21,579 1021 1112 716 404 877 1047 1080
Perc 2.849 2.682 3.281 3.459 5.855 6.108 5.754
Rate mean rate, Std dev standard deviation of interest rate, Amount total amount lent, Perc market share of
total amount traded, Trades number of trades
hard to detect. The descriptive measures proposed in the previous section point to
the presence of asymmetries in the interbank market. However, the opacity of the
information available does not allow a structural interpretation of these patterns.
In this section, we discuss key-player characteristics in detail. We start by focusing
on the 95th percentile of the distribution in Fig. 5. This provides information on the
“big lenders”, namely, the banks that lend a great deal of cash while borrowing little.
We then examine the 5th percentile of the distribution in Fig. 5. This tail identifies the
“big borrowers”, which are the key drivers of the net demand for cash.
The empirical distributions reported in Fig. 5 are characterized by an invariant right
tail for 2006 and 2007. A similar picture emerges between 2008 and 2009. The nodes
change between 2007 and 2008, suggesting that an important change took place in
2007. In general, the eruption of financial market turmoil the Euro area in August 2007
appears to have modified the prevailing organization of the market.14
Who are the key players? To shed light on the microstructure of exchanges, we
report some descriptive statistics on the lending activities of the big lenders in Tables
9 and 10. To avoid approximation errors, in this section we report statistics from the
original tick-by-tick dataset. There are several dimensions of interest. The first one
concerns the market share covered by the big players. The descriptive statistics in
Tables 9 and 10 show that these actors are indeed “big”. For instance, in each quarter
of 2006 and 2007, the percentage of cash supplied by these banks to the market was
never less than 29% of the total volume. Tables 11 and 12 report some descriptive
statistics on the borrowing activities of the big borrowers. The tables reveal that the
14 Tensions in segments of the U.S.-dollar-denominated money markets reached their highest point on
August 9, 2007. To stabilizemarket conditions, the ECB started a series of open-market operations supplying
Euro-denominated cash.
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Table 10 Descriptive statistics for the big lenders for 2008–2009
2008 I Market IT0193 IT0224 IT0255 IT0264 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 4.04 4.042 4.039 4.030 4.041 4.036 4.002
Std dev 0.097 0.087 0.083 0.088 0.109 0.110
Amount 405109.34 10300 16614.19 21132.39 21185 14031.21 25890.26
Trades 1012 729 517 332 612 992
Perc 2.543 4.101 5.216 5.229 3.464 6.391
2008 II Market IT0193 IT0198 IT0224 IT0255 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 3.971 3.977 3.958 3.975 3.991 3.978 3.947 3.962
Std dev 0.111 0.150 0.101 0.101 0.113 0.149 0.139
Amount 430543.410 10396.07 18608.55 19576.1 31479.4 21037.39 18635.8 23607.4
Trades 864 776 741 402 430 668 850
Perc 2.415 4.322 4.547 7.312 4.886 4.328 5.483
2008 III Market IT0164 IT0186 IT0193 IT0224 IT0242 IT0255 IT0264
Rate 4.218 4.234 4.211 4.245 4.247 4.227 4.205 4.205
Std dev 0.212 0.200 0.173 0.189 0.201 0.168 0.206
Amount 373334.62 11000.6 11859.85 12843.8 20315.65 7512.4 23743.4 14840.7
Trades 607 454 1059 631 534 519 294
Perc 2.947 3.177 3.440 5.442 2.012 6.360 3.975
2008 IV Market IT0164 IT0175 IT0224 IT0255 IT0269 IT0279
Rate 3.061 3.043 3.105 3.157 2.923 3.024 2.852
Std dev 0.680 0.580 0.617 0.547 0.379 0.585
Amount 301774.06 7350.9 6135.4 10,358.1 12,520 9165.5 9972.85
Trades 353 410 378 236 309 486
Perc 2.436 2.033 3.432 4.149 3.037 3.305
2009 I Market IT0173 IT0190 IT0193 IT0203 IT0208 IT0224
Rate 1.234 1.332 1.269 1.154 1.116 1.203 1.159
Std dev 0.400 0.409 0.241 0.295 0.454 0.333
Amount 236035.41 7710.5 7582.6 5605.81 19,758.5 7993.2 10263.25
Trades 376 361 490 500 681 367
Perc 3.267 3.212 2.375 8.371 3.386 4.348
2009 II Market IT0175 IT0193 IT0224 IT0260 IT0261 IT0279
Rate 0.668 0.653 0.656 0.660 0.762 0.714 0.649
Std dev 0.224 0.234 0.234 0.247 0.179 0.244
Amount 263223.96 6146.1 6740.4 14973.45 13034.8 15428.81 13050.3
Trades 404 554 603 502 217 574
Perc 2.335 2.561 5.688 4.952 5.861 4.958
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Table 10 continued
2009 III Market IT0175 IT0193 IT0197 IT0224 IT0279
Rate 0.329 0.330 0.323 0.296 0.335 0.340
Std dev 0.051 0.065 0.043 0.056 0.069
Amount 193894.12 4600.65 6898.7 9605 12,577.7 8897.45
Trades 357 660 434 635 454
Perc 2.373 3.558 4.954 6.487 4.589
2009 IV Market IT0193 IT0197 IT0208 IT0224 IT0260
Rate 0.295 0.298 0.277 0.274 0.307 0.310
Std dev 0.053 0.041 0.056 0.044 0.063
Amount 224112.92 5025.95 17201.5 5390.9 10,915.23 11945.75
Trades 473 601 380 413 497
Perc 2.243 7.675 2.405 4.870 5.330
Rate mean rate, Std dev standard deviation of interest rate, Amount total amount lent, Perc market share of
total amount traded, Trades number of trades
market is more concentrated on the demand side than on the supply side. In fact, the
large borrowers control between 38 and 55% of traded volumes for the time span
considered. This suggests that the key players have a tight grip on traded volumes
both on the lending side and the demand side.
How stable is the composition of the group of key players? Tables 9 and 10 reveal
a rich landscape of behaviors. First, identification of the key players confirms the
marked changes in network structure that took place during the turmoil. There are
substantial entry and exit dynamics in the two groups across time. For example, the
percentage of long-lasting big lenders (i.e., present for more than four quarters) is
26%; the corresponding figure for big borrowers is 41%. This confirms our previous
results indicating that the interbank market is not populated by actors with long-term
strategies. Rather, large net-lending and net-borrowing decisions appear contingent
on temporary factors, and are driven only by opportunistic behaviors and short-term
strategies.
The changing ranks at the top layer of banks may be due to several factors. As
stressed by Heider et al. (2009), cash hoarding is engaged for precautionary reasons
during phases of market breakdown. Hence, banks that are large net cash suppliers
at a given point in time may choose to reverse their course of action and become
net borrowers. These banks may even choose to stay out of the market to avoid the
adverse consequences of the increase in system-wide counterparty risk. The entry-exit
dynamics displayed by the group of big borrowers is instead largely affected by the
stigma that attaches to large demands for cash (see La Ganga and Vento 2010). Since
the posting of ask trades in e-MID is public information, banks have an incentive to
leave the platform during phases of market turbulence and opt for over-the-counter
trading.
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Table 12 Descriptive statistics for the big borrowers for 2008–2009
2008 I Market IT0162 IT0165 IT0168 IT0210 IT0258 IT0270 IT0278
Rate 4.04 4.046 4.058 4.036 4.042 4.061 4.022 4.039
Std dev 0.080 0.079 0.100 0.080 0.104 0.082 0.084
Amount 405109.34 31604.6 27394.5 24446 18487.7 31544.49 22178.71 22094.95
Trades 1369 1837 848 902 1446 943 963
Perc 7.801 6.762 6.034 4.564 7.787 5.475 5.454
2008 II Market IT0159 IT0160 IT0165 IT0253 IT0258 IT0267 IT0278
Rate 3.971 3.940 3.972 3.994 3.946 3.970 3.959 3.987
Std dev 0.146 0.130 0.088 0.133 0.107 0.149 0.105
Amount 430543.410 37007.06 22068.7 22238.7 39070 19124.52 19769.45 34495.2
Trades 1169 853 1353 883 873 947 1559
Perc 8.595 5.126 5.165 9.075 4.442 4.592 8.012
2008 III Market IT0162 IT0165 IT0253 IT0258 IT0267 IT0270 IT0278
Rate 4.218 4.214 4.262 4.117 4.233 4.199 4.163 4.262
Std dev 0.172 0.156 0.291 0.134 0.233 0.229 0.149
Amount 373334.62 18738.7 15024.4 15395.85 17053 33971.9 19721.8 51083.3
Trades 956 972 307 748 822 885 2316
Perc 5.019 4.024 4.124 4.568 9.100 5.283 13.683
2008 IV Market IT0159 IT0160 IT0165 IT0237 IT0253 IT0267
Rate 3.061 3.061 3.044 3.097 3.984 3.146 3.268
Std dev 0.484 0.618 0.571 0.394 0.389 0.615
Amount 301774.06 22376.42 17426.3 19842.6 15735.3 15705.9 41928.21
Trades 608 924 1257 418 404 562
Perc 7.415 5.775 6.575 5.214 5.205 13.894
2009 I Market IT0160 IT0165 IT0168 IT0265 IT0270 IT0284
Rate 1.234 1.370 1.276 1.040 1.150 1.023 1.072
Std dev 0.435 0.421 0.224 0.354 0.298 0.255
Amount 236035.41 26875.4 16260.9 27433.3 21942.9 12,048.7 16597.7
Trades 1146 1116 1155 974 629 798
Perc 11.386 6.889 11.623 9.296 5.105 7.032
2009 II Market IT0159 IT0160 IT0165 IT0168 IT0265 IT0284
Rate 0.668 0.585 0.719 0.660 0.666 0.603 0.584
Std dev 0.198 0.239 0.210 0.170 0.226 0.211
Amount 263223.96 16566 19573.9 16596.95 32762.1 22318.04 28710.7
Trades 552 792 1034 1274 939 1151
Perc 6.294 7.436 6.305 12.446 8.479 10.907
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Table 12 continued
2009 III Market IT0160 IT0165 IT0168 IT0223 IT0265
Rate 0.329 0.356 0.312 0.296 0.355 0.291
Std dev 0.061 0.050 0.050 0.070 0.044
Amount 193894.12 19757.3 9132.7 31526.19 6739.2 14031.09
Trades 643 669 1405 729 639
Perc 10.190 4.710 16.259 3.476 7.236
2009 IV Market IT0159 IT0160 IT0168 IT0265 IT0284
Rate 0.295 0.276 0.342 0.296 0.281 0.281
Std dev 0.048 0.067 0.066 0.040 0.044
Amount 224112.92 26045.08 26743.25 38465.7 16226.9 17045
Trades 922 967 1718 736 664
Perc 11.621 11.933 17.164 7.241 7.606
Rate mean rate, Std dev standard deviation of interest rates, Amount total amount borrowed, Perc market
share of total amount traded, Trades number of trades
8.1 Pricing interbank deposits and the key players
The big lenders have market power over the distribution of money. In other words,
their behavior determines how the ECB’s money supply propagates through e-
MID. Hence, it is worth understanding whether the big lenders exploit their market
power by engaging in pricing policies that are more aggressive, or “predatory”,
than those of other lenders. Two alternative and “extreme” hypotheses are proposed.
On one hand, a bank that controls the relative supply of deposits within a net-
work has the power to charge lending rates higher than the average rate. On the
other, exchanges within a network may be driven by trust among counterparties (see,
e.g., Cocco et al. 2009). Thus, a lender may refrain from charging above market
rates to secure a “safer” demand for funds that carry below-average counterparty
risk.
To investigate this issue, we compare the average interest rates big lenders demand
from alternative classes of borrowers. We divide the borrowers in four groups based
on the volume of funds they receive from each big lender. In practice, we compute
the quartiles of the distribution of volumes borrowed, and classify the banks that
borrow from the key lenders using the empirical quartiles. Group 1 includes those
banks that borrow little, while Group 4 contains large borrowers. We then run an
analysis of variance on the interest rates. We test whether a key player’s lending
rate to each group of borrowers is equal or lower than the overall group’s average
rate. The alternative hypothesis is that a key player’s lending rate is larger than the
average rate. We report the test results in Tables 13 and 14, where we denote by “rate
group n” the lending rate relative to the nth quartile of the distribution of volumes
lent. The evidence suggests that there is a large variation in the key lenders’ pricing
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Table 13 Average lending rates offered by the big lenders to four groups of borrowers (2006–2007)
2006 I GR0006 IT0185 IT0187 IT0257 IT0258 IT0259 IT0269 IT0278
F 0.270 3.176 2.951 1.636 2.094 4.290 5.868 1.076
P value 0.847 0.024 0.032 0.179 0.099 0.005 0.001 0.358
Rate Group 1 2.397 2.375 2.390 2.376 2.389
Rate Group 2 2.411 2.393 2.385 2.449 2.380
Rate Group 3 2.460 2.402 2.411 2.423 2.432
Rate Group 4 2.430 2.416 2.410 2.411 2.420
2006 II IT0185 IT0187 IT0258 IT0259 IT0261 IT0265 IT0269 IT0279
F 1.797 3.098 11.665 4.209 1.329 0.393 2.426 8.433
P value 0.147 0.026 0.000 0.006 0.264 0.758 0.064 0.000
Rate Group 1 2.670 2.609 2.656 2.622 2.634
Rate Group 2 2.622 2.672 2.688 2.599 2.715
Rate Group 3 2.613 2.628 2.672 2.608 2.653
Rate Group 4 2.630 2.601 2.638 2.622 2.658
2006 III IT0193 IT0258 IT0259 IT0261 IT0263 IT0265 IT0269 IT0279
F 2.244 0.269 0.326 0.580 0.754 2.654 5.112 10.613
P value 0.082 0.848 0.807 0.628 0.521 0.049 0.002 0.000
Rate Group 1 2.979 2.906 2.949 2.828
Rate Group 2 2.921 2.812 2.940 2.927
Rate Group 3 2.956 2.921 2.894 2.918
Rate Group 4 2.937 2.923 2.927 2.917
2006 IV GR0006 IT0173 IT0187 IT0193 IT0242 IT0265 IT0269 IT0279
F 0.689 0.756 2.035 0.447 5.942 1.127 2.963 1.190
P value 0.559 0.519 0.108 0.719 0.001 0.339 0.031 0.312
Rate Group 1 3.324 3.407 3.419
Rate Group 2 3.401 3.452 3.372
Rate Group 3 3.381 3.437 3.352
Rate Group 4 3.384 3.377 3.350
2007 I IT0187 IT0193 IT0198 IT0257 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
F 2.158 3.494 1.189 1.117 0.273 0.324 1.234
P value 0.091 0.015 0.313 0.341 0.845 0.808 0.296
Rate Group 1 3.578 3.601
Rate Group 2 3.616 3.581
Rate Group 3 3.623 3.581
Rate Group 4 3.612 3.623
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Table 13 continued
2007 II IT0185 IT0187 IT0208 IT0257 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
F 2.249 1.731 6.314 5.444 0.327 3.956 0.397
P value 0.082 0.159 0.000 0.001 0.806 0.008 0.756
Rate Group 1 3.917 3.952 3.857 3.907
Rate Group 2 3.867 3.873 3.870 3.814
Rate Group 3 3.878 3.869 3.876 3.837
Rate Group 4 3.871 3.831 3.837 3.816
2007 III IT0187 IT0193 IT0208 IT0224 IT0255 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
F 1.720 1.184 3.722 4.969 0.492 1.118 3.844 1.673
P value 0.161 0.315 0.011 0.002 0.688 0.341 0.009 0.171
Rate Group 1 4.191 3.980 4.081
Rate Group 2 4.121 4.078 4.093
Rate Group 3 4.070 4.065 4.074
Rate Group 4 4.073 4.116 4.040
2007 IV IT0187 IT0193 IT0224 IT0255 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
F 7.792 1.968 0.659 2.227 1.414 5.411 0.286
P value 0.000 0.117 0.577 0.084 0.237 0.001 0.836
Rate Group 1 3.858 3.984 3.996
Rate Group 2 3.972 3.978 3.956
Rate Group 3 3.980 3.970 3.920
Rate Group 4 3.971 3.932 3.909
F test of the analysis of variance, P value probability of the F test, Rate Group 1–Rate Group 4 average
rates of the 4 group of borrowers
behavior across time. In 2006, the big lenders that exhibit higher average lending
rates in the market are those engaged in aggressive pricing behavior. This pattern
reverses during 2007 until the second quarter of the 2008 and it turns again during
2009.
We also look at whether big borrowers are drivers for the borrowing rates. In
this case, we are interested in understanding whether the key borrowers pay above-
average interest rates in a systematic manner. Tables 15 and 16 report the average
borrowing rates offered by four groups of lenders. These groups are again identified
from the quartiles of the distribution of volumes borrowed. We test the null of equality
between the borrowing rates of each key borrower from each lender group and the
average rate for the group itself. The alternative hypothesis is that the former rate
is higher than the latter. Within the class of big borrowers, different banks receive
different treatment from alternative groups of counterparties. Tables 15 and 16 show
that larger net borrowers pay higher interest rates. This pattern was observable before
the beginning of the turmoil and becomes more evident after 2007.
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Table 14 Average lending rates offered by the big lenders to four groups of borrowers (2008–2009)
2008 I IT0193 IT0224 IT0255 IT0264 IT0269 IT0279
F 0.857 1.539 2.389 0.955 0.774 0.971
P value 0.463 0.203 0.068 0.414 0.509 0.406
Rate Group 1 4.032
Rate Group 2 4.045
Rate Group 3 4.016
Rate Group 4 4.033
2008 II IT0193 IT0198 IT0224 IT0255 IT0261 IT0269 IT0279
F 0.628 6.515 1.136 1.132 8.453 1.763 0.379
P value 0.597 0.000 0.334 0.336 0.000 0.153 0.768
Rate Group 1 3.994 3.876
Rate Group 2 3.974 3.987
Rate Group 3 3.984 3.977
Rate Group 4 3.936 3.987
2008 III IT0164 IT0186 IT0193 IT0224 IT0242 IT0255 IT0264
F 1.146 5.000 6.424 4.807 0.045 1.738 0.570
PROB 0.330 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.987 0.158 0.635
Rate Group 1 4.004 4.286 4.150
Rate Group 2 4.230 4.257 4.217
Rate Group 3 4.215 4.271 4.240
Rate Group 4 4.215 4.223 4.268
2008 IV IT0164 IT0175 IT0224 IT0255 IT0269 IT0279
F 8.847 3.826 2.092 1.183 0.717 1.867
P value 0.000 0.010 0.101 0.317 0.543 0.134
Rate Group 1 2.595 2.923 2.870
Rate Group 2 3.029 3.032 3.156
Rate Group 3 2.830 3.239 3.212
Rate Group 4 3.186 3.066 3.165
2009 I IT0173 IT0190 IT0193 IT0203 IT0208 IT0224
F 8.482 2.895 1.700 4.211 3.355 6.745
P value 0.000 0.035 0.166 0.006 0.019 0.000
Rate Group 1 1.136 1.500 1.122 1.154 1.228
Rate Group 2 1.392 1.229 1.091 1.210 0.992
Rate Group 3 1.469 1.216 1.043 1.271 1.087
Rate Group 4 1.255 1.269 1.153 1.149 1.209
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Table 14 continued
2009 II IT0175 IT0193 IT0224 IT0260 IT0261 IT0279
F 4.294 1.223 0.954 3.549 5.067 5.780
P value 0.005 0.301 0.414 0.014 0.002 0.001
Rate Group 1 0.562 0.823 0.798 0.614
Rate Group 2 0.643 0.743 0.823 0.580
Rate Group 3 0.576 0.696 0.706 0.614
Rate Group 4 0.673 0.784 0.689 0.685
2009 III IT0175 IT0193 IT0197 IT0224 IT0279
F 1.069 0.064 1.375 3.530 14.975
P value 0.362 0.979 0.250 0.015 0.000
Rate Group 1 0.330 0.301
Rate Group 2 0.342 0.327
Rate Group 3 0.322 0.312
Rate Group 4 0.339 0.356
2009 IV IT0193 IT0197 IT0208 IT0224 IT0260
F 0.748 1.221 9.103 1.299 15.070
P value 0.524 0.301 0.000 0.274 0.000
Rate Group 1 0.250 0.386
Rate Group 2 0.314 0.334
Rate Group 3 0.271 0.290
Rate Group 4 0.270 0.310
F test of the analysis of variance, P value probability of the F test, Rate Group 1–Rate Group 4 average
rates of the 4 group of borrowers
What are the economic implications of our findings? The identification of key
players emphasizes the uneven access to money in the interbank market. In the pres-
ence of consolidated network links between financial institutions, a buoyant supply
of cash from the central bank may not necessarily “pass through” the system if key
players take advantage of market bottlenecks. Therefore, during periods of market
stress, even through a central bank might lower the benchmark rate, the market may
not show improvement in terms of traded volumes. We find that large net lenders
in e-MID exploit their “market power” in the supply of cash to the interbank mar-
ket.
8.2 Robustness analysis
To investigate the robustness of our modeling approach, we derive a list of key players
based on each of the five values of α. We repeat the analysis carried out in the body of
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Table 15 Average interest rates paid by the big borrowers on loans from four groups of lenders (2006–2007)
2006 I IT0180 IT0188 IT0210 IT0267 IT0268 IT0270 IT0271 IT0272
F 5.778 1.021 2.255 10.832 4.321 6.456 0.887 1.446
P value 0.001 0.382 0.080 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.447 0.228
Rate Group 1 2.407 2.397 2.300 2.378 2.422
Rate Group 2 2.345 2.410 2.356 2.406 2.482
Rate Group 3 2.409 2.430 2.376 2.427 2.434
Rate Group 4 2.395 2.422 2.406 2.409 2.442
2006 II IT0162 IT0203 IT0210 IT0267 IT0268 IT0270 IT0271 IT0272
F 1.375 5.226 4.604 6.083 4.582 1.811 1.291 0.712
P value 0.249 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.143 0.276 0.545
Rate Group 1 2.519 2.659 2.559 2.646
Rate Group 2 2.610 2.630 2.592 2.640
Rate Group 3 2.600 2.617 2.596 2.632
Rate Group 4 2.606 2.640 2.623 2.654
2006 III IT0168 IT0210 IT0214 IT0267 IT0268 IT0270 IT0271 IT0272
F 2.455 11.990 3.713 8.992 4.046 1.608 0.260 0.151
P value 0.063 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.186 0.854 0.929
Rate Group 1 2.850 2.978 2.913 2.798 2.962
Rate Group 2 2.932 3.001 2.942 2.904 2.979
Rate Group 3 2.937 2.956 2.926 2.910 2.974
Rate Group 4 2.926 2.947 2.890 2.913 2.950
2006 IV IT0162 IT0168 IT0203 IT0210 IT0268 IT0270 IT0271 IT0272
F 6.314 0.195 3.494 6.158 2.395 3.389 1.596 5.531
P value 0.000 0.900 0.015 0.000 0.067 0.017 0.189 0.001
Rate Group 1 3.350 3.303 3.337 3.385
Rate Group 2 3.386 3.380 3.353 3.405
Rate Group 3 3.451 3.349 3.344 3.433
Rate Group 4 3.402 3.372 3.375 3.391
2007 I IT0162 IT0168 IT0210 IT0254 IT0256 IT0271 IT0272
F 5.937 4.060 4.188 6.667 2.373 1.376 2.204
P value 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.069 0.249 0.086
Rate Group 1 3.540 3.499 3.604 3.415 3.554 3.617
Rate Group 2 3.568 3.598 3.593 3.460 3.543 3.611
Rate Group 3 3.576 3.593 3.625 3.533 3.595 3.624
Rate Group 4 3.602 3.599 3.621 3.568 3.592 3.608
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Table 15 continued
2007 II IT0162 IT0165 IT0168 IT0210 IT0256 IT0270 IT0272
F 0.797 0.952 1.700 3.805 3.818 0.695 0.539
P value 0.496 0.415 0.166 0.010 0.010 0.555 0.656
Rate Group 1 3.850 3.786
Rate Group 2 3.911 3.884
Rate Group 3 3.871 3.870
Rate Group 4 3.879 3.856
2007 III IT0162 IT0165 IT0210 IT0258 IT0267 IT0270 IT0272 IT0278
F 1.403 2.145 1.019 0.505 2.089 0.458 0.691 5.262
P value 0.240 0.093 0.383 0.679 0.100 0.712 0.558 0.001
Rate Group 1 4.146 4.041
Rate Group 2 4.127 4.090
Rate Group 3 4.088 4.029
Rate Group 4 4.102 4.064
2007 IV IT0160 IT0162 IT0165 IT0210 IT0267 IT0272 IT0278
F 9.271 0.064 4.086 3.394 20.041 4.578 2.703
P value 0.000 0.979 0.007 0.017 0.000 0.004 0.044
Rate Group 1 3.739 3.920 3.945 3.615 3.751 3.921
Rate Group 2 3.902 3.946 3.966 3.749 3.816 3.915
Rate Group 3 3.903 3.971 3.988 3.845 3.870 3.955
Rate Group 4 3.923 3.971 3.979 3.873 3.864 3.945
F test of the Analysis of Variance, P value probability of the F test, Rate Group 1–Rate Group 4 average
rates of the 4 group of lenders
the paper and compare the results on bank pricing policies. For the largest number of
quarters, we find that the value α = 0.5 allows detecting the highest number of banks
that charge above-average lending rates.Hence, forα = 0.5, banks lend/borrowmoney
at a price higher than the market price on average in 12 of the 16 periods considered.
Overall, the proportions of banks demanding/paying above-average rates are equal to
55.59% for α = 0.5, 48.25% for α = 0.75, 1, 44.76% for α = 0, and 40.77% for
α = 0.25.
9 Conclusion
Extant work on network effects in the money market studies short-term relations
between banks. In this paper, we focus on the long-term patterns of network for-
mation. Using a dataset from the electronic platform e-MID, we provide evidence
of evolving relations that induced an uneven distribution of cash between banks
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Table 16 Average interest rates paid by the big borrowers on loans from four groups of lenders (2008–2009)
2008 I IT0162 IT0165 IT0168 IT0210 IT0258 IT0270 IT0278
F 3.695 3.142 2.537 0.995 6.547 1.302 0.585
P value 0.011 0.024 0.055 0.395 0.000 0.273 0.625
Rate Group 1 4.011 4.074 4.030 4.107
Rate Group 2 4.056 4.049 4.051 4.076
Rate Group 3 4.046 4.057 4.049 4.057
Rate Group 4 4.046 4.060 4.030 4.055
2008 II IT0159 IT0160 IT0165 IT0253 IT0258 IT0267 IT0278
F 2.163 1.844 1.945 3.245 1.104 4.565 1.513
P value 0.091 0.138 0.120 0.021 0.347 0.003 0.209
Rate Group 1 3.903 3.920 3.878
Rate Group 2 3.956 3.912 3.956
Rate Group 3 3.944 3.953 3.959
Rate Group 4 3.937 3.952 3.966
2008 III IT0162 IT0165 IT0253 IT0258 IT0267 IT0270 IT0278
F 5.757 1.336 0.453 3.204 3.095 3.811 1.846
P value 0.001 0.261 0.715 0.023 0.026 0.010 0.137
Rate Group 1 4.128 4.238 4.118 4.057
Rate Group 2 4.173 4.193 4.181 4.158
Rate Group 3 4.209 4.245 4.172 4.146
Rate Group 4 4.227 4.236 4.216 4.179
2008 IV IT0159 IT0160 IT0165 IT0237 IT0253 IT0267
F 1.315 3.015 3.599 8.018 1.676 30.908
P value 0.268 0.029 0.013 0.000 0.172 0.000
Rate Group 1 3.288 3.046 3.813 3.783
Rate Group 2 3.047 3.212 3.901 3.755
Rate Group 3 2.980 3.070 3.946 3.848
Rate Group 4 3.076 3.079 4.082 3.167
2009 I IT0160 IT0165 IT0168 IT0265 IT0270 IT0284
F 23.238 3.509 2.676 3.901 2.603 0.966
P value 0.000 0.015 0.046 0.009 0.051 0.408
Rate Group 1 1.654 1.435 1.119 1.257 1.107
Rate Group 2 1.245 1.293 1.060 1.218 0.971
Rate Group 3 1.318 1.296 1.037 1.133 0.995
Rate Group 4 1.439 1.243 1.032 1.129 1.044
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Table 16 continued
2009 II IT0159 IT0160 IT0165 IT0168 IT0265 IT0284
F 1.623 1.498 1.918 0.597 0.552 7.034
P value 0.183 0.214 0.125 0.617 0.647 0.000
Rate Group 1 0.622
Rate Group 2 0.533
Rate Group 3 0.570
Rate Group 4 0.607
2009 III IT0160 IT0165 IT0168 IT0223 IT0265
F 4.934 2.657 2.761 7.834 2.693
P value 0.002 0.047 0.041 0.000 0.045
Rate Group 1 0.344 0.319 0.293 0.363 0.281
Rate Group 2 0.363 0.299 0.293 0.357 0.282
Rate Group 3 0.369 0.317 0.292 0.338 0.290
Rate Group 4 0.349 0.312 0.300 0.366 0.294
2009 IV IT0160 IT0165 IT0168 IT0223 IT0265
F 1.694 6.406 1.678 1.418 0.068
P value 0.167 0.000 0.170 0.238 0.977
Rate Group 1 0.321
Rate Group 2 0.323
Rate Group 3 0.301
Rate Group 4 0.288
F test of the analysis of variance, P value probability of the F test, Rate Group 1–Rate Group 4 average
rates of the 4 group of lenders
during the recent financial turmoil. These patterns of exchange are largely asym-
metric and imply a clear division of roles between lenders and borrowers. We identify
key players that affect the demand and supply sides of the market and consider the
implications of their pricing strategies. We find that the banks driving the supply
of interbank deposits do, indeed, exploit their market power by imposing addi-
tional interest-rate charges. At the same time, the large borrowers pay above-average
rates.
Our results are a starting point for future research. First, available panel-data meth-
ods could be used to estimate loan demand and supply in the Euro interbank market.
A study of supply and demand shocks would shed light on the drivers of the market.
Look at each bank’s contribution to these aggregate shocks would be of interest. The
idea of relationship lending could be formalized in the form of anticipated persistent
shocks to the supply of cash.
This would allow formally testing for the pricing effects of these shocks. In this
paper, we disregard the explicit role of the primary supply of money. However, a study
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that investigates whether the interbank market is driven by key players at a higher
frequency, for instance, at a weekly frequency, would allow factoring in the indirect
effect of the ECB’s liquidity supply on network relations.
Since the issue of systemic risk has become very important, providing network-
based measures for the risk of contagion would be very helpful. Alternative
methodologies could be employed to study whether the big players can be a source of
systemic risk, thus contributing to network disruptions. For this purpose, it would be
relevant to study how big players contribute to the probability of network fragmenta-
tion.
Babus (2006) suggests that interbank networks are formed between banks that are
privy to information about counterparty risk, or “risk of contagion”. In future work,
we are planning to compute formal measures of asymmetric information, such as the
probability of informed trading (see Easley and O’Hara 1987). We can then study the
relation between asymmetric information and indicators of network structure. Since
information is often argued to be a determinant of asset prices (see, e.g., Easley et al.
2002), we can also investigate the joint contribution of private information and network
centrality to the determination of interbank rates.
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